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Abstract
Community involvement and the preventive behavior of households are considered
to be at the heart of vector-control strategies. In this work, we consider a simple
theoretical model that enables us to take into account human behaviors that may
interfere with vector control. The model reflects the trade-off between perceived costs
and observed efficacy. Our theoretical results emphasize that households may reduce
their protective behavior in response to mechanical elimination techniques piloted by a
public agent, leading to an increase of the total number of mosquitoes in the surrounding
environment and generating a barrier for vector-borne diseases control. Our study is
sufficiently generic to be applied to different arboviral diseases. It also shows that
vector-control models and strategies have to take into account human behaviors.
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1 Introduction
Many preventive technologies are among the most inexpensive ways to promote good health
and are often cheaper than curative healthcare. However, how people make decisions about
the use of low-cost preventive technologies remains unclear. Education may influence the
adoption of health technologies or counteract the natural tendency to do the wrong thing
[1, 2, 3]. The returns to adoption could be an additional explanation [4, 2]. The unobserved
characteristics of adopters may account substantially for the value assigned to protective or
curative measures [5, 6, 7]. For instance, in the case of vector-borne diseases such as malaria,
unobserved reasons for not using insecticide treated nets (such as personal beliefs, perceived
temperature, smell, number of mosquitoes or comfort) have often been presented as evidence
to explain the low adoption or use of nets. However health care researchers have traditionally
regarded such reasons as the result of irrational, misinformed or subjective behavior.
In this work, we study a related process at the heart of community-based healthcare
strategies, with an emphasis on vector-control programs1: community involvement and
households’ protective behaviors in the context of a public intervention. We focus on me-
chanical elimination techniques which, in this study, refer primarily to the elimination of
breeding sites to reduce the mosquito population around the house. Mechanical elimination
is among the cheapest interventions described above and can therefore result in high mon-
etary returns. Such methods have been recommended by the World Health Organization
(WHO) for the control of arboviral diseases or malaria (for exophagic/exophilic aedes or
anopheles that are best controlled through the destruction of breeding sites) and can be im-
plemented either by an external agency or directly by households in their private dwellings
[8]. Mechanical control has also been modelled in [9, 10, 11] to study its impact on the
Aedes albopictus population and on the epidemiological risk. We argue that eliminating
breeding sites is a choice made by the household and, consequently, adoption rates reflect
the household’s trade-off between perceived costs and observed efficacy. In addition, we
show that a mechanical elimination intervention piloted by an external agent might act as a
substitute for private protection rather than a complement. Furthermore, if the intervention
induces a psychological effect (a perceived improvement in safety or well-being), community
1Vector control is any method to limit or eradicate the mammals, birds, insects or other arthropods which
transmit disease pathogens.
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(aggregate) protection level might be lower in the intervention group. As a result, those who
received the intervention may be worse off than if they had not received it.
Based on previous works, done by the authors, our study focuses on Aedes species,
and in particular Aedes albopictus [12], also called the tiger mosquito. It is particularly
threatening due to its potential for transmitting a wide range of arboviruses, including
dengue, chikungunya, yellow fever, and several other types of encephalitides [13, 14, 15, 16].
A. albopictus is now well established in places where the socioeconomic level of the population
is high (in Southern Europe, for instance). Education levels are also high, as is knowledge
of disease transmission and recommended practices specific to the elimination of larval sites.
Though our study is applicable to risk from arboviral diseases2 and Aedes mosquitoes, it
holds implications for other vector-borne diseases control, like malaria.
Numerical simulations of our model focus on Réunion Island. Réunion is one of the
places in the world that has experienced a number of epidemics due to the favourable envi-
ronment it provides for the mosquito species to thrive. Past outbreaks of chikungunya and
dengue prompted authorities on the island to implement strategies to control mosquito den-
sity. Indeed, since the resurgence of dengue in 2004, and the major chikungunya outbreak
in 2005-2006, Health authorities have set up entomologic surveillance of Aedes albopictus in
all urban areas. This surveillance effort still continues today through the monitoring of tra-
ditional stegomyia indices at immature stages (i.e. Container Index, House Index, Breteau
Index)3 as are used in other control programmes [17]. Aedes albopictus remains the main
target of the work of the LAV (Lutte anti-vectorielle), a service which is organised by the Re-
gional Health Agency in Réunion. The vector-control strategy integrates five core activities:
vector surveillance, environmental, mechanical, and chemical control (larvicide being applied
rarely), and public health education campaigns. Vector control services also undertake the
early detection and treatment of cases of arboviral infection to prevent the spread of new
epidemics.
Given the investment of both financial and human resources toward the control of Aedes
albopictus and the observed rise of Aedes albopictus density in Réunion from 2006 to 2011
2There are no specific antiviral medicines or vaccines against Chikungunya and Dengue.
3The house index is defined as the percentage of houses infested by larvae and/or pupae. The container
index is defined as the percentage of water-holding containers with active immature stages of mosquitoes.
The Breteau index is defined as the number of positive containers per 100 houses, a positive container being
one that contains larval and/or pupal stages of mosquito.
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despite public action [18], we begin by modeling the household decision to eliminate lar-
val gites before providing an experimental test of the theory. While it fits to the most
recent bio-mathematical models applied to vector-control, the model differs from a mere bio-
mathematical approach and accounts for selfish externalities and human behaviors, reflecting
the trade-off between perceived costs and observed efficacy. We show that the elimination
of larval habitats by an external public agent may increase the mosquito population weeks
(or months) after the intervention. This situation corresponds to one of the numerical sim-
ulations of the model (that uses realistic parameters on the island).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present our Mosquito model
and provide some qualitative results. In section 3, we include Individual behaviors in the
entomological model. Then, in section in 4, we provide numerical simulations and we discuss
several scenarii. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Mosquito Model
Before combining individual behaviors with an entomological model, we will first consider
the following mosquito model, based on models developed and studied in [11] (see also the
related epidemiological models [9, 10, 19, 20], and references therein)


dLv
dt
= rbAv
(
1−
Lv
Kv
)
− (νL + µL)Lv,
dAv
dt
= νLLv − µvAv,
Lv(0) = L0,
Av(0) = A0,
(1)
where Av represents the adult mosquito population, and Lv, the "aquatic" (including eggs,
larvae, and pupae) population. The (biological) parameters of the models are described as
follows: r is the sex ratio, b is the mean number of eggs laid by a female mosquito per day
that have emerged as larvae, Kv is the maximal breeding capacity, 1/(νL + µL) is the mean
time a mosquito stays in the aquatic stage, µL is the aquatic daily death-rate, µv is the
female mosquito mean death-rate per day.
The right-hand side of system (1) is a continuously differentiable map (C1). Then, by the
Cauchy-Lipschitz theorem, system (1) provides a unique maximal solution. System (1) is
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biologically well posed: if the initial data are in R2+, then the solution stays in R
2
+: Lv = 0,
and Av = 0 are vertical and horizontal null lines respectively. Thus, no trajectory can cut
these axes. In fact, it is straighforward to show that the compact
K =
{
(Lv, Av) ∈ R
2
+ : Lv ≤ Kv, Av ≤
νL
µv
Kv
}
is positively invariant by (1).
Let us now give some qualitative results on system (1). Let
N =
νLrb
(νL + µL)µv
, (2)
the basic offspring number4. First, we can show that there exist two possible equilibria:
• a trivial equilibrium 0 = (0, 0)
• a positive equilibrium E = (L∗v, A
∗
v), when N > 1, defined as follows:


L∗v,=
(
1−
1
N
)
Kv,
A∗v =
νL
µv
(
1−
1
N
)
Kv.
(3)
E belongs to K, and, thus, is biologically realistic, i.e. it is positive and bounded.
The dynamic of model (1) can be summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Assume that (L0, A0) ∈ K.
• When N ≤ 1, the trivial equilibrium 0 is globally asymptotically stable, which means
that the mosquito population will dwindle until extinction, whatever the initial popula-
tion.
• When N > 1, the trivial equilibrium is unstable and the positive equilibrium E is
globally asymptotically stable, which means that the mosquito population persists.
Proof. We will use some results related to cooperative systems. These type of systems are
very important and well-known in Biology and Ecology, for which many useful theoretical
results have been proved [21]. A general definition is
4The basic offspring number represents the average number of offsprings produced over the lifetime of an
individual (under ideal conditions)
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Definition 1. The system x˙ = f(x) is called cooperative if for every i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} such
that i 6= j the function fi(x1, ..., xn) is monotone increasing with respect to xj.
It is also easy to verify that system (1) is a cooperative system in K. To show both GAS
results, we will use a theorem proved in [22, Theorem 6, page 376].
• When N ≤ 1, system (1) has only the trivial equilibrium 0. Thus taking a = 0 and
b = (Kv,
νL
µvN
Kv), we have f(a) = 0 and f(b) < 0. It follows from Theorem 6 ([22]),
that 0 is globally asymptotically stable on [0,b], hence on K, when N ≤ 1.
• When N > 1, there exists ε > 0 such that N > 1 + ε. Let Lε sufficiently small such
that
Lε ≤ ε,
Aε =
νL (1 + ε)
µvN
Lε ≤ ε
Let aε = (Lε, Aε)
T . Then, from the right-hand side of (1) and the fact that N > 1 + ε
and Kv >> 1, we deduce
f(aε) ≥


(νL + µL)ε
(
1−
1 + ε
Kv
)
Lε
νL
(
1−
1 + ε
N
)
Lε

 > 0. (4)
Hence it follows from Theorem 6 [22] that equilibrium E = (L∗v, A
∗
v)
T is globally asymp-
totically stable on [aε,b]. Since aε can be selected to be smaller than any x > 0, we
have that E is asymptotically stable on K with basin of attraction K˜ = K \ 0. This
also implies that 0 is unstable and conclude the proof.
It is also obvious that the mosquito population is related to the maximum larvae or
aquatic capacityKv. Thus, reducingKv will decrease the mosquito population. This explains
why mechanical control (i.e. the action of reducing all potential breeding sites) is very
important. Of course it is well known that Kv may change according to the environment
[23].
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3 Economic entomological model with protection
For the rest of the section, we assume that N > 1. Let us now consider that individuals use
either mechanical control or do not use mechanical control. Assuming that a proportionH of
people agree to consider mechanical control, we suppose that the efficiency of the mechanical
control is related to H such that, the decrease in K becomes more important as more people
practice mechanical control. Thus, when mechanical control occurs, the aquatic carrying
capacity decays according to the following law:
Kv = (1− γ(H))Kv, (5)
where γ is defined such that γ ∈ [0, 1] is a non-decreasing function, with γ(0) = 0 and
0 < γ(1) < 1 , which means that we cannot destroy all breeding sites, even if the whole
population were to participate, H = 1. The efficacy γ can depend on several parameters like
environmental parameters, such as rainfall or the quality of mechanical control. Thus γ can
be defined as a linear function, like
γ(x) = ax, with a ∈]0, 1[ (6)
or as a sigmoid-shape function
γ(x) =
ax
1 + ax
, with a > 0, (7)
where a is a parameter that can be related to the rate of efficacy.
Note also that the larvae capacity Kv does not remain constant, even after intervention.
Thus, Kv tries to reach Kmax, the maximal larvae capacity. The carrying capacity varies
according to environmental parameters, and we don’t know exactly how to model it. That
is why several empirical models could be considered. Among them, we choose one of the
simplest. Let rK a parameter related to the growth rate. For instance, if we assume that
the environment is favorable (due to regular rainfall, for instance), then rK can be large
such that Kv grows rapidly to Kmax, that can be choosen very large. In contrast, when
the environment is not favorable (drought or dry season), then rK << 1 (and even equal
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to 0) and Kmax can be choosen very low. Altogether, we can consider the following growth
equation that features the previous properties according to the sign of rK :


dKv
dt
= rK (Kmax −Kv) ,
Kv(0) = K0
(8)
Thus, assuming that rK > 0, since KV (t) = Kmax − (K0 −Kmax) e−rKt, Kv will converge
(rapidly or not, depending on rK) to the maximum larvae capacity, Kmax.
Remark 1. According to environmental parameters, like temperature and rainfall, Kmax and
rK can be chosen time-dependant, which implies that
K(t) = Kmax(t) + (K0 −Kmax(t))e
−
∫
t
0
rK(τ)dτ .
If mechanical control occurs on day tm, then we consider this control as “instantaneous”
(say, it is done in one day). This can be modeled as follows:
Kv(t
+
m) = (1− γ(H(tm))Kv(tm). (9)
Thus assuming that mechanical control starts on day t0 and occurs every τ days, then, we
obtain the following impulsive differential equation


dKv
dt
= rK (Kmax −Kv) ,
∆Kv(t0 + nτ) = −γ(H(t0 + nτ))Kv(t0 + nτ), n = 0, 1, 2, ...,
Kv(0) = K0,
(10)
where ∆x(t) = x(t+) − x(t). According to the theory of impulsive differential equations
[24], equation (10) is well defined and has a unique positive solution. If H is assumed to be
constant, i.e. H(t) = H0 then, using straightforward computations, it is possible to show
the following results.
Proposition 2. Equation (10) admits the following periodic equilibrium Kv,per :
Kv,per(t) =
(
1−
γ(H0)e
−rK(t−nτ)
1− (1− γ(H0))e−rKτ
)
Kmax, t ∈ [nτ, (n + 1)τ [ and n = 0, 1, 2, ... (11)
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Then, setting y = Kv −Kv,per it is straightforward to show that y is solution of


dy
dt
= −rKy,
∆y(t0 + nτ) = 0, n = 0, 1, 2, ...,
y(0) = K0 −Kv,per(0).
(12)
Obviously, y goes to 0 as t goes to +∞. Thus, we deduce
Proposition 3. Kv solution of (10) converges globally asymptotically to Kv,per
Set
C = rK
γ(H0)
1− e−rKτ
. (13)
From the previous propositions, we can show
Proposition 4. Assume that H converges to H0. If N , γ(H0) and τ are choosen such that
•
N >
(
1 +
µv
νL
1
1− γ(H0)
C
)(
1 +
1
νL + µL
1
1− γ(H0)
C
)
, (14)
then (1)-(10) admits a unique periodic equilibrium which attracts all initial conditions
in K.
•
N ≤
(
1 +
µv
νL
C
)(
1 +
1
νL + µL
C
)
, (15)
then the solution of system (1)-(10) converges to the trivial equilibrium 0.
Proof. Using proposition 2, we know that Kv converges to a periodic equilibrium. Thus
assuming that t is sufficiently large, system (1) becomes a periodic cooperative system of
period τ : 

dLv
dt
= rbAv
(
1−
Lv
Kv,per(t)
)
− (νL + µL)Lv,
dAv
dt
= νLLv − µvAv.
(16)
The previous system is not really practical to handle, in particular because the maximal
larvae capacity is now time dependant. To circumvent this difficulty, we make the following
change of variables:
u =
Lv
Kv,per
and v =
µv
νL
Av
Kv,per
, (17)
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such that (u, v) ∈ [0, 1]2 and
du
dt
=
1
Kv,per
dLv
dt
− u×
1
Kv,per
dKv,per
dt
= rb
νL
µv
v(1− u)−
(
νL + µL + rK
(
Kmax
Kv,per
− 1
))
u
and
dv
dt
=
(
1
Kv,per
dAv
dt
− v ×
1
Kv,per
dKv,per
dt
)
= νL
(
u−
(
1 +
µv
νL
rK
(
Kmax
Kv,per
− 1
))
v
)
,
which leads to the system


du
dt
= rb
νL
µv
v(1− u)−
(
νL + µL + rK
(
Kmax
Kv,per
− 1
))
u,
dv
dt
= νL
(
u−
(
1 +
µv
νL
rK
(
Kmax
Kv,per
− 1
))
v
)
.
(18)
In fact system (16) enters the family of periodic cooperative systems with a concave nonlin-
earity [25, 26]. So, let us consider a periodic cooperative system of n differential equations
x˙ = F (t, x), (19)
with concave nonlinearities. Since A(t) is a n× n continuous matrice in R, τ -periodic in t,
we denote
aij = max
0≤t≤τ
aij(t), aij = min
0≤t≤τ
aij(t)
and set
A = (aij) A = (aij).
Thus
A ≤ A(t) ≤ A for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ.
Set p a positive real. For reader’s convenience, let us recall [26, Theorem 5.5, page 230].
Theorem 1. Let F (t, x) be continuous in R× [0, p]2, τ -periodic in t for a fixed x and assume
DxF (t, x) exists and is continuous in R × [0, p]
2. Assume that all solutions are bounded in
9
[0, 1]2 and F (t, 0) = 0. Assume
∂Fi
∂xj
≥ 0, (t, x) ∈ R× [0, p]2,
and A(t) = DxF (t, 0) is irreducible for any t ∈ R,
(C) if 0 < x < y, then DxF (t, x) > DxF (t, y).
Then
1. If all principal minors of −A are nonnegative, then limt→∞ x(t) = 0 for every solution
of (19) in [0, p]2.
2. If −A has at least one negative principal minor, then (19) possesses a unique positive
τ -periodic solution which attracts all initial conditions in ]0, p]2.
In our case, we have p = 1 and
F (t, x) =


rb
νL
µv
x2 (1− x1)−
(
νL + µL + rK
(
Kmax
Kv,per
− 1
))
x1
νL
(
x1 −
(
1 +
µv
νL
rK
(
Kmax
Kv,per
− 1
))
x2
)

 .
Clearly F is continuous and τ -periodic. Moreover
∂xF (t, x) =


−
(
rb
νL
µv
x2 + νL + µL + rK
(
Kmax
Kv,per
− 1
))
rb
νL
µv
(1− x1)
νL −νL
(
1 +
µv
νL
rK
(
Kmax
Kv,per
− 1
))

 .
From which we deduce that
∂Fi
∂xj
≥ 0 for all (x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1]2. When 0 < x < y, we have
obviously
∂xF (t, y) < ∂xF (t, x).
Finally
A = ∂xF (t, 0) =


−
(
νL + µL + rK
(
Kmax
Kv,per
− 1
))
rb
νL
µv
νL −νL
(
1 +
µv
νL
rK
(
Kmax
Kv,per
− 1
))

 .
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Clearly, A is irreducible for all t. Using Proposition (2), we have
(1− γ(H0))(1− e−rKτ )
1− (1− γ(H0))e−rKτ
Kmax ≤ Kv,per(t) ≤
1− e−rKτ
1− (1− γ(H0))e−rKτ
Kmax.
Thus, we deduce
−A =


(
νL + µL + rK
γ(H0)
(1− γ(H0))(1− e−rKτ )
)
−rb
νL
µv
−νL νL
(
1 +
µv
νL
rK
γ(H0)
(1− γ(H0))(1− e−rKτ )
)


and
−A =


(
νL + µL + rK
γ(H0)e
−rKτ
1− e−rKτ
)
−rb
νL
µv
−νL νL
(
1 +
µv
νL
rK
γ(H0)e
−rKτ
1− e−rKτ
)


First, according to Theorem 11, we have to study all principal minors of −A. The diagonal
terms are positive, and a straighforward computation show that det(−A) ≤ 0 if following
inequality is verified
N ≤
(
1 +
µv
νL
e−rKτC
)(
1 +
1
νL + µL
e−rKτC
)
.
Following Theorem 12, since all diagonal terms of −A are positive, we need to verify that
det(−A) < 0. A straigforward computation shows that we have to verify
N >
(
1 +
µv
νL
1
1− γ(H0)
C
)(
1 +
1
νL + µL
1
1− γ(H0)
C
)
.
Thus, applying Theorem 1, using the change of variables (17), and the fact that Kv,per is a
τ - periodic function, we deduce the desired results.
3.1 The Model with Individual behaviors
Now, we aim to define H . Taking into account that we have individuals that will make
mechanical control, m = 1, and individuals that will not make mechanical control, m = 0,
we only consider two status for people: being bitten (or bothered) by mosquitoes, σ(b) = b,
and not being bitten (or bothered), σ(b) = nb. Then, the probability of being bitten, at
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least once, without mechanical control, is:
pi = P (b(m) = 1/m = 0). (20)
Similarly, we can define the following probabilities:


P (b(m) = 0/m = 0) = 1− pi,
P (nb(m) = 1/m = 1) = 1.
(21)
Remark 2. For the numerical simulations, we have to define pi, the probability of being
bitten, at least k times. We will consider a Poisson law, P(λ), where λ depend on the
number of mosquitoes per human, i.e. λ =
Av
Nh
. Thus
pi = P (X ≥ k) = 1− FP (k, λ),
where FP is the cumulative Poisson distribution, k, the number of bites, is choosen according
to the level of tolerance of the population to mosquito bites.
Thus, taking into account that mechanical control has a direct cost (spend a couple of
hours per week to clean the garden) and an indirect cost (pay people to make mechanical
control: in general people paid by a public agency, and thus indirectly by taxes), we have
the following maximization program:
maxmE[u(σ(m))]− κWm, (22)
where u(b) and u(nb) are the utility levels attached to the bitten status, with 0 < u(b) <
u(nb). W is the marginal utility and is supposed to be constant, and κ is the cost of
mechanical control. κ may depend on two variables sl, the level of local interventions (by
people themselves) and se, the level of external interventions (by ARS agents), that is:


κ(sl, se) = κ0sl + κ1se,
where se ∈ {0, 1} ,
(23)
κ0 and κ1 are constants related to the cost of each intervention.
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Therefore, an individual will partake in mechanical control if κW is lower than the
expected utility loss related with the risk of being bitten without mechanical control:
E [u(σ(1)− u(σ(0))] ≥ κW (24)
The expected utility can be estimated using (20) and (21). Altogether, an individual will
use mechanical control if pi is above a certain threshold, that is:
pi ≥
κ0slW
u(nb)− u(b)
mechanical control is utilized only by local people, i.e. se = 0 (25)
and
pi ≥
(κ0sl + κ1)W
u(nb)− u(b)
mechanical control is utilized by local people and ARS agents, i.e. se = 1.
(26)
Thus, from (25), we deduce Sl, the threshold related to sl:
Sl = G
−1
0 (pi) =
1
κ0
(
pi (u(nb)− u(b))
W
)
(27)
Therefore, using (26), Sl becomes:
Sl = G
−1
1 (pi) =
1
κ0
(
pi (u(nb)− u(b))
W
− κ1
)
(28)
Consequently, assuming that f is the probability density function of s, the proportion of
people that will finally use mechanical control can be defined as follows:
H =
∫ +∞
Sm
f(s)ds = 1− F (G−1k (pi)), (29)
where F is the cumulative distribution function related to f, and k ∈ {0, 1}.
Thus, knowing H , we can solve system (10). In particular, following the previous propo-
sitions above, we infer:
Proposition 5. Assume N > 1, and H converges to H0.
• If (14) is true, then system (1)-(10) will converge to a positive periodic equilibrium.
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• If (15) is true, then system (1)-(10) will converge to the zero equilibrium.
4 Numerical simulations
We now derive some simulations to better illustrate the model of the previous section and
discuss some possible scenarios.
Let us first explain the parameter values taken in our simulations. The relationship
between utility and income takes the form of a constant relative risk aversion utility function.
Thus, the marginal utility of income, W , is given by [27]:
W = e−β log(Income), (30)
where β = 1.2, Income = 103 euros, the daily mean salary of Réunion island5. We also
choose uc as a constant following [28]:
u(nb)− u(b) = uc ∈ [0, 1], (31)
In particular, we will consider three different values for uc, 0.3, 0.6 and 0.9. Indeed, in
[28], the authors use the EuroQol states trade-off (EuroQol-STO) to derive the mosquito-
abundance-utility score (ranging between 0 and 1) by allowing residents to elicit preferences
between alternative health states, instead of time, and living an average day with mosquitoes.
They find that living an average day with mosquitoes in their yard and porch during the
summer of 2010 was worse than living an average day with the specified comparator health
conditions and diseases. The average (SD) utility based on EuroQol-STO was 0.87 ± 0.03,
corresponding to a utility loss of 0.13. For the cost constants κi, used in (23), we consider
κ0 = 14.8
6, and κ1 = 0 (fully subsidized), 50, and 100 respectively. Finally, we compute H ,
using (29), with f following a normal distribution N (0,
uc
Wκ0
).
The larvae capacity recovery rate rK can vary throughout the year because it is generally
related to environmental parameters, like rainfall. For simplicity, we consider rK to be
constant.
5See INSEE website accessed July 2014.
6The hourly mean salary in the considered region.
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We assume that individuals implement mechanical control every week. Seventy days (10
weeks) after the start of the mechanical control, there is a field intervention from ARS such
that 50% of the larval capacity is destroyed in addition to the decay obtained by individuals.
The ARS intervention has a cost, so more people react and partake in mechanical control
during the external intervention.
According to [23], we choose the following values for the mosquito biological parameters:
r × b = 5, νL = 1/15 , µL = 0.01 , µv = 0.05, rK = 0.05, Kmax = 2 × 106. As initial vector
we choose (L(0), A(0), K(0)) = (20000, 20000, 20000). These parameters reflect realistic
conditions in Réunion.
The numerical simulations are provided using the nonstandard finite difference method,
which has showed to be very effective to solve ODES systems in mathematical epidemiology
and population dynamics (see for instance [29, 30, 31] and references therein). Nonstandard
methods are also suitable to solve impulsive differential equations too [32]
Figure 1: Baseline Scenario - Evolution of the mosquito population (with - blue line - and
without - black line - External intervention at day 70; local people don’t yet make mechanical
control)
In Figure 1, we show the dynamics of the adult mosquito with and without an external
intervention. Note that the model excludes human behaviors. We start with an initially
15
small number of larvae and adults to take into account the dynamics between September-
October, when the mosquito population is small, and March-April, when the population is
large. This transition is important: we start with Av(0)/Nh = 0.1 to Av(0)/Nh ≈ 10 at
equilibrium, where Nh is the Human population. Notably, the external intervention reduces
the number of mosquitoes for only a couple of weeks. Afterward, the solution converges to
the positive equilibrium. This indicates that destroying breeding sites should be regularly
undertaken and maintained.
In the following simulations, we illustrate our predictions when endogenous human behav-
ior is incorporated in the model and consider different scenarios. As numerical simulations
are globally robust for every sub-case of each scenario, we only provide a closer look at the
middle sub-case of each scenario for illustration (the cost of the intervention is estimated as
53 euros per household).
• In scenario 1 (Figures 2, 3, 4), we consider different utility values uc (0.3, 0.6, 0.9) and
different costs for the external intervention κe, i.e. 0, 50 and 100 euros per individual
(or house) treated. We also assume that people do not change their level of tolerance to
mosquito bites. For instance, we may assume a mean tolerance threshold to mosquito
bites equal to 3 bites per day, that is k = 3 (see remark 2). Whatever the value
taken by uc, the cost of the local intervention may impact H : the larger κe, the larger
H . Altogether, the external intervention has an impact that last only for a couple of
weeks, before the system reaches again the periodic equilibrium.
• In scenario 2 (Figure 5, we consider uc = 50 and κe = 60. We assume a psychological
effect of the intervention (such as a placebo effect for a clinical treatment), that is, the
level of tolerance to mosquito bites is higher after the external intervention due to a
psychological effect of the intervention. In other words, we shift the bites tolerance
thresholds k from 3 to 6, 9 and 12 (see remark 2) after the external intervention. Due to
this effect, less and less people perform mechanical control themselves (which explains
lower values forH with external intervention than without). This implies automatically
that the mosquito population shifts to a new periodic equilibrium, larger than before
the external intervention, with oscillations of smaller amplitude.
• In scenario 3 (Figure 6, page 21), we consider uc = 0.6 and κe = 50. We assume
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Figure 2: Scenario 1a. We consider the utility value uc = 0.3 with different costs for the
external intervention κe, i.e. 0, 50 and 100 euros per individual (or house) treated are
considered.
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Figure 3: Scenario 1b. We consider the utility value uc = 0.6 with different costs for the
external intervention κe, i.e. 0, 50 and 100 euros per individual (or house) treated are
considered.
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Figure 4: Scenario 1c. We consider the utility value uc = 0.9 with different costs for the
external intervention κe, i.e. 0, 50 and 100 euros per individual (or house) treated are
considered.
19
Figure 5: Scenario 2. Different bites tolerance thresholds k (6, 9 and 12) with an utility
value uc = 0.6, and a cost for the external intervention κe = 50 euros per individual (or
house) treated.
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that people increase the larval capacity growth rate (rK = 0.06 after intervention)
such that the periodic equilibrium is larger than without external intervention. For
instance people may clear themselves of the responsibility to clean their larval gites
because of the action made by the public agency. However, since the tolerance against
mosquito bites does not change, He is larger than H .
Figure 6: Scenario 3. (uc = 0.6 and κe = 50) - Evolution of the mosquito population and
proportion of people that will do mechanical control (with and without external intervention
at day 70; local people make mechanical control every 7 days)
• Scenario 4 (Figure 7, page 22) is a mixed of the scenarii 2 and 3: we assume that the
tolerance k increase from 3 to 6, and rK increase from 0.05 to 0.06. Then, as expected,
the mosquito population larger than before the external intervention. However we have
He < H .
Also, it would be possible to consider rK and Kmax (as well as the mosquito parameters)
as periodic functions (according to dry and we seasons) or general function related to tem-
perature and humidity data, the results obtained by numerical simulations in the previous
scenarii still remain (or even can be worse!).
5 Conclusion
Our study aims to contribute to the understanding of public policy aspects of health. Though
the public benefits of community-based healthcare strategies may be high, the immediate
21
Figure 7: Scenario 4. (uc = 0.6 and κe = 50) - Evolution of the mosquito population and
Proportion of people that will do mechanical control (with and without external intervention
at day 70; local people make mechanical control every 7 days)
when rK and k increase.
private returns of private behaviors could be low. Achieving widespread adoption of accurate
preventive behaviors, then, might require costly sustained subsidies or taxation [33, 34]. In
addition, public action may generate perverse incentives. Our model can highlight several
scenarii that may be used to reveal household behaviors in response to a public interven-
tion and give policy recommendations. Notably, an external public health intervention may
increase stegomya and entomological indices in the presence of endogenous protective be-
haviors and, as a consequence, public health interventions may have perverse effects. This
may happen if the intervention induces a placebo effect, which is highly probable for many
public health interventions involving human interactions, or if individuals clear themselves of
the responsibility to clean their garden. The predictions of the model could be tested easily
and a randomized experiment has been conducted recently for this purpose. Preliminary
results in Réunion island seem to confirm this assertion. Altogether, human (individual and
group) behaviors are important components that need to be taken into account in control
Modelling. Our work bring some insights in this direction.
In [11], where Sterile Insect Technique (SIT) models for Aedes albopictus was developed
and studied, it was proved that coupling SIT with Mechanical Control perform (far) better
results than without. According to the present work, it seems necessary to reevaluate these
results, and to take into account the impact of human behaviors.
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